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PLANT-PROTECTION EMPLOYEES UNDER
CURRENT FEDERAL LABOR LEGISLATION
By Fred Witney, Ph.D.
Department of Economics, University of Illinois
On May 19, 1947 the Supreme Court of the United States held
that the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner
Act) are applicable to the collective bargaining activities of plant-
protection employees.^ Two decisions previously handed down by
Circuit Courts of Appeals were reversed by the action of the high
Court. The decisions of the Court served to focus the attention of
Congress on the status of plant guards under the National Labor
Relations Act. A provision in the original House version of what
became the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley
bill), would have prohibited the certification of bargaining units
composed of plant-protection employees. This provision initially
attracted little attention. The Senate did not at first recommend such
a measure, and there is reason to believe that Congress would not
have included this provision in the final draft of the Taft-Hartley
bill had not the Supreme Court decisions of May 19 highlighted
the issue.^
The Supreme Court decisions were announced while a joint
congressional committee was considering the Taft-Hartley bill and
directed immediate attention to the status of plant-protection em-
ployees. When the conference committee returned the bill to
Congress, a provision was included which would prevent the full
application of the National Labor Relations Act to plant-protec-
tion employees. Under terms of the new measure, unions composed
of plant-protection employees which are affiliated with production
workers' organizations may not be certified as lawful bargaining
agents.^ The Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, also prohibits
the National Labor Relations Board from designating as appro-
priate a single bargaining unit including both plant guards and rank-
and-file workers. Since the Board has consistently refused in the
past to group production workers and plant-protection employees in
the same bargaining unit, this provision of the new act is of rela-
tively minor importance. On the other hand, the Board has fre-
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quently awarded certifications to unions representing units com-
posed solely of plant guards, even though these unions are affiliated
with production workers' labor organizations. Even though these
limitations were placed on the organizational activities of plant-
protection employees, this group of workers was less affected than
foremen. The Taft-Hartley measure strips supervisors of all the
benefits of the National Labor Relations Act.
Congress subsequently overrode the President's veto of the
Taft-Hartley bill, and the measure became law on June 23, 1947.
Under the terms of the new law, amendments to the National
Labor Relations Act do not take effect until sixty days after June
23, 1947. Until that date it appears that the N.L.R.B. may still
certify a plant guards' union even though it is affiliated with a
rank-and-file labor organization. In addition, certification of a plant
guards' union associated with a production workers' union, made
prior to the effective date of the new law, is not invalidated until
one year after the date of the certification.
Are Plant Guards "Employees"?
The chief purpose of this bulletin is to present an analysis of
the status of plant-protection employees under the original and
amended National Labor Relations Act. The fundamental issue is:
Are these workers to be treated as "employees" within the mean-
ing of the original and amended Act? To analyze this problem,
particular attention must be directed to decisions of the National
Labor Relations Board, to court rulings, and to action taken by the
Congress.
Modern industrial plants ordinarily employ a plant-protection
force. The duties of plant guards include inspecting persons, pack-
ages, and vehicles, checking passes and identification cards, carrying
money and other valuables from one part of a plant to another, and
patrolling the premises of the property to detect fires, espionage,
sabotage, and suspicious circumstances. With the outbreak of World
War H, the number of plant-protection employees greatly increased.
This increase resulted from the federal government's requirement
that all employers having war-materiel contracts provide their
plants with an adequate security force.
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Before Pearl Harbor, plant-protection employees were under
the direct supervision of the employers for whom they worked.
Shortly after the United States entered World War II, however,
the government directed that plant-protection employees of em-
ployers holding war-production contracts be enrolled as civilian
auxiliaries to the military police. Authority for the induction of the
civilian guards into the auxiliaries sprang from an Executive
Order which authorized and directed "the Secretary of War . . .
to establish and maintain military guards and patrols . . . "* On
the basis of this Order, the War Department issued a directive
which provided for the organization, training, and discipline of
civilian militarized guards.^
These guards were required to enter into signed agreements with
the United States which stipulated that they would faithfully dis-
charge their duties. Under this arrangement, the security employees
agreed to obey the orders of the President of the United States and
of his duly authorized officers, subjected themselves to the Articles
of War, and thereby placed themselves under military law. Finally,
before assuming the status of a militarized guard, the plant-protec-
tion employee took the customary oath given upon induction into
the Army. Although security workers were not actually members of
the armed forces, they apparently had a real and direct relationship
to the military services.
In spite of their militarized status, plant-protection employees,
like the production workers, found that grievances arose out of
their conditions of work. To adjust such complaints, some guards
sought to organize and to bargain collectively under the protection
of the National Labor Relations Act. Some employers, however,
contended that the plant guards had no standing under the terms
of the Act. They maintained that the guards were not employees
within the meaning of the Act. It was further alleged that if plant
guards were unionized, they could not render their full loyalty to
management and thus could not faithfully execute management's
orders. According to this argument, security workers subject to
union discipline would place the interests of organized production
workers above those of the company.^ The N.L.R.B. was called on
to reconcile this delicate and difficult problem. It is reported that
"few single questions have been contested in N.L.R.B. proceedings
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more often during the past . . . years than union organization of
plant guards."' Before attention is given to the problem of whether
or not militarized guards are "employees" for purposes of the
National Labor Relations Act, it is first necessary to deal with the
status of non-militarized security employees.
N.L.R.B. Rulings Before Militarization
of Guards
Early in World War II the National Labor Relations Board
ruled that non-militarized guards were employees under the terms
of the National Labor Relations Act, and as such, were entitled to
the protection of the Act.® The Board rejected the contention that
plant-protection workers were a part of management and hence
could not constitute an appropriate unit for the purpose of collective
bargaining.
The position of the Board on the organizational activities of
plant-protection employees has been consistent. In contrast, the
Board's attitude toward foremen has shifted three times. Long
before the Packard Motor Car Company case (which finally estab-
lished applicability of the National Labor Relations Act to fore-
men), the N.L.R.B. ruled that plant-protection employees were
entitled to the benefits of the Act. According to the Board, these
workers performed duties which were "monitorial" rather than
"supervisory." Thus, plant guards have consistently received pro-
tection under the National Labor Relations Act. Foremen, on the
other hand, were required to wait until March, 1945, before the
N.L.R.B. recognized them as "employees" under the Act for
purposes of collective bargaining, and until March, 1947, before
the Supreme Court upheld the N.L.R.B. ruling.^
The N.L.R.B. took note in one 1942 case that the guards in-
volved constituted the lowest step in the company's system of plant-
protection employees. The N.L.R.B. pointed out that it could find
"nothing in the duties of the patrolmen ... to warrant depriving
them of the right to self-organization and collective bargaining
guaranteed under the [National Labor Relations] Act."" Evidence
revealed that these guards were under the supervision of the chief
of the security force and his captain, lieutenants, and sergeants.
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The Board also noted that the security employees' union in this
case was separate from the one representing the production workers.
Not only did this plant-protection employees' labor organization
constitute a separate bargaining unit, but their union zuas not
affiliated with any rank-and-file labor organization.
When a case arose in which a guards' labor organization zvas
affiliated with a production workers' union, the Board continued to
rule that the security employees' union constituted an appropriate
unit for purposes of collective bargaining." The Board, neverthe-
less, did classify these guards in a bargaining unit separate and
distinct from the one which included production employees. This
distinction was deemed necessary because of the difference in the
functions and interests of the two groups. Beyond this limitation,
security employees were afforded the full opportunity to choose any
lawful organization as their bargaining agent. On this score, the
N.L.R.B. declared that neither the company nor the Board could
deny to any employee, including the plant-protection worker, his
statutory right to select whatever legitimate bargaining agent he
desired.
The Board did not accept the argument that security workers
should be denied the protection of the National Labor Relations Act
because they were bonded by a city.^" The fact that these bonded
guards carried firearms, inspected all incoming and outgoing ve-
hicles, checked identification cards of all employees, and were
required to maintain general law and order within a plant, did not
place them beyond the protective scope of the National Labor
Relations Act. In another case, the Board refused to exclude se-
curity employees from coverage of the Act merely because they
guarded the company's property against sabotage and theft.^^ In this
case, however, the Board rejected the union's request to include
part-time guard sergeants in a plant-protection employees' bargain-
ing unit. It was contended that, since the temporary sergeants had
authority and duties distinct from those of the ordinary security
workers, the ordinary employees might be influenced in the exer-
cise of their collective bargaining rights by the sergeants' presence
in the bargaining unit. The Board also refused to include plant
guards in the same bargaining unit with production and maintenance
workers.^*
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Militarization of Plant-Protection Employees
Principles established by the N.L.R.B. in 1942, for the organi-
zation of civilian plant-protection employees remained in force
after the guards were inducted into Army and Navy auxiliaries.
The Board ruled that, in spite of their militarized status, security
workers were still "employees" under the terms of the National
Labor Relations Act. As "employees," the protection of the law was
available to them.^^ The armed services were responsible for the
guards' training, organization, and discipline, but the Board ruled
that security workers were still employees in their relations with
the company. It was pointed out that employers still possessed the
authority to fix the guards' compensation, to promote or demote
them, and to prescribe their working conditions. Notice was taken
that the military authorities reserved the right to veto the hiring
and discharging of plant guards when such action by the employer
might impair the efficiency of the force. But the Board still main-
tained that the power to employ and to dismiss remained essentially
a function of management.
Over one company's objections, the Board, later in 1942, found
a bargaining unit appropriate even though it contained several
corporals in addition to ordinary plant-protection employees, all
members of the Coast Guard Reserve. ^^ Evidence presented in this
case indicated that the corporals had no power to hire or to dis-
charge and were paid on an hourly rate similar to the ordinary
protection employees. The Board refused to exclude these corporals
even though they "posted" the plant's guard, transmitted messages
from the sergeants to the privates of the guard, and periodically
inspected the guard. ^^ The Board, however, continued to refuse to
include militarized plant-protection employees in the same unit with
production employees. ^^ The N.L.R.B. also declined to include first
aid employees in the same bargaining unit with militarized security
workers. ^^
Sergeants Excluded from Coverage
Neither would the Board hold as appropriate a bargaining unit
composed solely of guard sergeants. The Board found that these
employees were part of management, and as such, were excluded
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from the coverage of the National Labor Relations Act.^" The
Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, appears to implement this
decision as long as the duties of plant guard sergeants are regarded
as "supervisory" rather than "monitorial." As already indicated,
the new labor act excludes supervisors from coverage under its
terms.
The N.L.R.B. later held that a rank-and-file labor organiza-
tion could represent a unit of militarized security w^orkers.^^ This
conformed with rulings involving non-militarized protection em-
ployees. The Board declared in one case that "freedom to choose
a bargaining agent includes the right to select a representative
which has been chosen to represent the employees of the employer
in a different bargaining unit."^^ The N.L.R.B. was mindful, how-
ever, of the increased responsibilities placed upon plant-protection
employees in wartime. It recommended in this case that the national
union involved sharply define the authority of the production
workers' bargaining unit and the security employees' bargaining
unit so that the respective duties of each group of workers could
be performed competently and impartially. Not only did the Board
rule that the same national union could represent both production
workers and militarized plant-protection employees, but the
N.L.R.B. further directed that the same local union could legally
represent both categories of workers.^^
Position of Military Authorities
A short time after the N.L.R.B. decided these cases, the armed
services recommended to the Board that it refrain from certifying
militarized security employees' unions which were affiliated with
rank-and-file labor organizations. Ranking officers of the Army and
the Navy addressed a joint letter to the Chairman of the N.L.R.B.
setting out the position of the armed forces. It was pointed out that
militarized security employees must "perform their duties without
hesitation or influence by outside organizations and without fear
or expectation that their performance of duty will be subject of
review by any authorities other than military authorities.""* The
letter acknowledged the right of the guards to collective bargaining,
but stated that the Army and Navy believed continuation of this
N.L.R.B. policy would injure the domestic security program.
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In a case immediately following this declaration of the military
authorities, the N.L.R.B. generally reaffirmed its former policy."
The Board did, however, sustain in part the viewpoint of the
military authorities by refusing to classify militarized guards in the
same unit with non-militarized security employees. On this point,
the Board stated that it could not "regard the induction of the
guards into the [military auxiliaries] as a meaningless act, since it
does indicate that such persons from the nature of their oaths then
owe allegiance directly to the government as well as to the corpora-
tion."^^ Beyond this concession, the Board did not grant the armed
services' request. Instead, the N.L.R.B. ruled that guards who were
militarized did not lose their "employee" status under the terms of
the National Labor Relations Act, and consecjuently were entitled
to choose any labor union which can be certified as a bargaining
agent under the Act.^' Shortly after this case, the War Department
issued a memorandum which reconciled the Army's official position
with that of the National Labor Relations Board. ^^
Plant-Protection Employees and the Courts
Despite the War Department's general approval of the Board's
position on the collective bargaining activities of militarized guards,
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals in Chicago held in 1945
in the Atkins case that the protection of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act was not available to militarized security employees. ^^
Specifically, the Court held that militarized guards were not "em-
ployees" under the terms of the National Labor Relations Act, and
consequently the N.L.R.B. could not direct an employer to bargain
with the representatives of their organizations. The Court stated
that "in our view, the relation which they sustain to the federal
government is wholly incompatible with the theory that they are
employees of the [company] within the meaning and purposes of
the n'l.R.A."
In support of the contention that the militarized guards were
emplovees under the terms of the National Labor Relations Act,
the Board pointed out: (1) that they were paid by the company;
(2) that the guards were hired by the employer and could be dis-
charged by the corporation; (3) that the company exercised general
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control over the terms and conditions of their employment. The
Court rejected the Board's position, holding that the guards were
under direct control of the military service and that they were
hired and discharged only in conformance with the armed forces'
recommendations. As for the compensation argument, the Court
stated that the government actually paid the guards, though the com-
pany acted as the government's agent.
In the Jones and Laiighlin case, the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals in Cincinnati held that a bargaining unit composed of
militarized plant guards was not an appropriate one within the
meaning of the National Labor Relations Act.^° In contrast with the
decision in the Atkins case, the Court at Cincinnati held that
militarized guards were "employees" under the terms of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. Nonetheless, the Court declared that
such employees could not constitute a proper unit for purposes of
collective bargaining. Accordingly, it was held, the N.L.R.B. could
not lawfully order an employer to bargain with a union representing
militarized plant guards.
The fact that the nation was at war apparently prompted the
Cincinnati Court's ruling. It held:
(1) That the N.L.R.B. failed to give sufficient weight to the rela-
tionship of militarized plant-protection employees to the war production
program
;
(2) Even though they might be treated as employees for National
Labor Relations Act purposes, militarized guards could not constitute
an appropriate bargaining unit;
(3) Such units were not appropriate because organized guards
might hold their labor organization's interests paramount to those of
the public;
(4) The N.L.R.B. failed in its duty to promote and protect the
public welfare when it designated as appropriate a unit composed of
militarized plant-protection employees.
Both Circuit Court decisions were later appealed by the
N.L.R.B. to the Supreme Court of the United States.'' While the
cases were being appealed, however, the guards involved in the con-
troversies were being demilitarized.'" Accordingly, the Supreme
Court remanded both cases to the lower courts for redetermination
in view of the demilitarization.
n. OP
«'Ur u^
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In spite of the guards' demilitarization, the Chicago Circuit
Court held that plant-protection workers were still not "employees"
within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act.^^ In this,
the Atkins case, the Court found no reason to change its previous
decision merely because the plant-protection workers were demili-
tarized. Their status as plant-guards continued to preclude the ap-
plication of the Act.
In the Jones and Langhlin matter, the Cincinnati Court held
that plant guards, regardless of their demilitarization, might not
be represented by a rank-and-file labor organization.^* The Court
did not clearly state what would be the legal status of a plant-
protection employees' union which was not affiliated with a rank-
and-file labor organization. Instead, the Cincinnati Court based its
decision primarily on the fact that a single labor organization rep-
resented both plant-protection employees and production workers.
This was particularly objectionable, in the Court's view, because
such an arrangement resulted in divided loyalties. The Court noted
that plant guards in this case were deputized by the City of Cleve-
land as policemen, after being demilitarized. As policemen, the
Court said, the guards
:
. . . have an obligation to the community as sworn, bonded, and
commissioned police officers; in case of industrial unrest and strikes on
the part of the production employees, the obligations of the plant guards
to the municipality and the state would be incompatible with their
obligation to the Union, which since it represents production employees,
authorizes and directs the strike.
Thus, both Circuit Courts of Appeals prevented the full appli-
cation of the National Labor Relations Act to labor organizations
composed of plant-protection employees. From these considerations
it appeared that only the Supreme Court and the Congress could
finally determine the extent to which plant-protection employees
might expect legal protection of their right to collective bargaining.
Supreme Court Overrules Both Decisions
The Supreme Court overruled the decisions of both lower
courts. The high Court, however, did not render its decisions
unanimously. In both cases the minority viewpoint reflected the
position of the Circuit Courts of Appeals. Since the arguments of
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the lower Courts have already been presented, no attempt will be
made to repeat them at this point. Plant-protection employees were
demilitarized at the time the Supreme Court reviewed the cases,
but the Court dealt with the applicability of the National Labor
Relations Act to militarized guards rather than limiting its atten-
tion to the status of non-militarized guards. Thus, the legality of
bargaining units of both categories of plant security workers was
settled. The pronouncements of the Court relating to militarized
guards are equally applicable to non-militarized plant-protection
employees.
In the Atkins case, the "employee" status of the militarized
guard was dealt with at great length. The high Court decided that
the fact of militarization did not destroy the basic employer-em-
ployee relationship between management and the plant-protection
employee. It was pointed out that management, despite the con-
trol exercised by the military authorities over the plant guards, still
could determine the guards' compensation, hours of work, and other
conditions of employment. Recognizing that the hiring and dis-
missal of these employees was subject to review by the military
authorities, the Supreme Court held that power to hire and dis-
charge remained essentially a function of the employer. In deciding
that the militarized plant-protection worker was an employee for
purposes of the National Labor Relations Act, the Court gave
great weight to Army Service Forces Circular No. 15, dated March
17, 1943, which in part stated:
Basically the militarization of plant guard forces has not changed
the existing systems of hiring, compensation and dismissal; all remain
primarily a matter between the guards and plant management. Guards
in the employ of a private employer may, as heretofore, be dismissed
by that employer.
Since the terms of employment involved negotiations between
employers and plant guards, the Court pointed out that the indi-
vidual security worker, like the single production employee, suffered
from inequality of bargaining power. In the absence of collective
bargaining, the terms of employment would be determined by the
employer alone. Hence, according to the Supreme Court, plant-
protection employees, like all workers, have a real need for collec-
tive bargaining. Neither the nature of their duties, nor their indue-
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tion into the auxiliaries of the military service, reduced the validity
of this consideration.
The Court refused to regard as controlling the argument that
unionized plant guards, militarized or non-militarized, might be less
loyal to management in the execution of their duties. Neither was
much weight given to the contention that labor organizations will
make demands upon unionized plant guards or force agreements
from management which will decrease the loyalty and the efficiency
of the guards. In this respect the Court stated that the process of
collective bargaining is "capable of adjustment to accommodate the
special functions of plant guards." From this statement it appears
that the Court would look with disfavor upon certification of a
bargaining agent which interferes with the proper execution of
duties by plant guards.
In the Jones and Laughlin case, the high Court dealt with two
major problems which were not present in the Atkins decision:
(1) The issue of whether a single labor union could represent both
a unit of plant-protection employees and a group of production and
maintenance workers;
(2) Application of the National Labor Relations Act to deputized
plant-protection employees.
Plant Guards and Rank-and-File Unions
The Circuit Court based its decision in the Jones and Laughlin
case primarily on the fact that the guards were represented by an
organization which also had been recognized as the bargaining agent
for production employees. The Supreme Court ruled, however, that
the N.L.R.B. could properly certify a single labor union as the ap-
propriate bargaining agent for both plant guards and production
workers. As already noted, the recently enacted Labor Management
Relations Act, 1947, nullifies this portion of the Supreme Court
ruling. Under terms of the new law, any union of plant guards
affiliated with a rank-and-file organization may not be certified by
the N.L.R.B.
A controlling consideration which prompted the Supreme
Court's decision on this point involved the official position of the
military authorities. The War Department was apparently recon-
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ciled to the fact that militarized guards could safely join and bargain
through unions representing production workers without decreasing
the guards' loyalty to the United States or impairing their ability to
perform their military duties effectively. In the light of this con-
sideration, the Court declared that "it is impossible to say that a
civilian agency erred in failing to insist upon what the military ex-
perts found to be unnecessary."
Another factor which influenced the Jones and Laughlin de-
cision was the right of all employees to select bargaining agents of
their own choosing. Limitation of this right, according to the Su-
preme Court, might deprive the plant-protection employees of effec-
tive collective bargaining. The Court adopted the view that a union
representing both plant-protection employees and production work-
ers might be the only one willing and able to deal with the employer.
It also pointed out that this union's experience and acquaintance
with the employer and the plant might make it particularly qualified
to bargain for the guards. On this issue, the high Court stated that
to prevent security workers "from choosing a union which also
represents production and maintenance employees is to make the
collective bargaining right of guards distinctly second class."
Deputized Plant Guards
The second problem peculiar to the Jones and Laughlin case was
the application of the National Labor Relations Act to deputized
plant-protection employees. After the guards in this case were de-
militarized, they were deputized by the police authorities of the City
of Cleveland, Ohio. The Supreme Court held that these deputized
employees could bargain under the protection of the National Labor
Relations Act. Deputized plant-protection employees, according to
the Court, bear the same fundamental relation to management as
do non-deputized guards. In addition, it was pointed out that their
connection with civil, police, municipal, or state authorities is not
one which is necessarily inconsistent with their status as employees
for the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act. Once more
the Court refused to give weight to the contention that organized
deputized gviards might not faithfully or effectively perform their
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duties and obligations to management or to the public. On this point,
the majority of the Court declared that:
If there is any danger that particular guards may not faithfully
perform their obligation to the public, the remedy is to be found other
than in the wholesale denial to all deputized guards of their statutory
right to join unions and to choose freely their bargaining agent. The
state and municipal authorities, in short, have adequate means of
punishing infidelity and assuring full police protection.
In other words, deputized guards can expect no protection from
the National Labor Relations Act if they fail to perform their duties
effectively or faithfully. A non-deputized plant-protection employee
may also be discharged or otherwise disciplined if he neglects his
duties or fails to give loyal service to management.
The Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley)
makes no distinction between deputized and non-deputized plant-
protection workers. Thus a union of deputized plant guards wdiich
is not affiliated with a rank-and-file labor organization may be certi-
fied by the N.L.R.B. On the other hand, if the deputized guards'
union is associated with a production workers' organization, such a
union may not be certified for the purpose of collective bargaining.
Conclusions
The status of plant-protection employees under federal labor
legislation is settled for the present. The decisions of the Supreme
Court and the N.L.R.B. establish that plant-protection employees,
whether or not militarized or deputized, may form labor organi-
zations and bargain collectively under protection of the National
Labor Relations Act. These unions, however, must comply with
two major qualifications: (1) Such unions may not be affiliated
with a rank-and-file organization; (2) such unions may not include
production workers. These limitations are set up in the new Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947.
Both the Supreme Court and the N.L.R.B. have also indicated
that unions bargaining for plant guards may not act as legal bar-
gaining agents if they interfere with the proper execution of the
duties of plant guards. Neither may security workers expect sup-
port from the N.L.R.B. if they fail to perform their duties in an
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efficient, faithful, and loyal manner. Management may discharge or
otherwise discipline an organized plant-protection employee who
fails to report, for example, espionage, theft, or sabotage. Under
these circumstances, the N.L.R.B. will not order his reinstatement.
On the other hand, the Board may direct the reinstatement of a
plant guard if he is discharged because of union activities. Nothing
in the new Labor ]\Ianagement Relations Act, 1947, prohibits the
Board from ordering the reinstatement of a plant guard discharged
because of labor union activities.
Finally, it may be pointed out that the new labor law does not
prohibit the execution of a collective bargaining agreement between
an employer and a plant-protection employees' labor organization
which is affiliated with a rank-and-file union. An employer is still
free, if he chooses (but is under no legal obligation), to recognize
and to bargain collectively with such a labor union.
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EDITORIAL NOTE
This Bulletin covers a question of considerable legislative and
judicial interest, although the number of workers involved is relatively
small. Recent court decisions and a section of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 1947, are concerned with the position of plant-protection
employees with respect to their right of collective bargaining. The ques-
tion was particularly significant during tl^ war but remains as an
important question in labor-management relations for a small but
significant group of workers in any plant. Since plant-protection em-
ployees seem to fall in a different category from production workers
in their relationships with management, a definition of their rights under
the National Labor Relations Act and the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act, 1947, has continuing and substantial interest to the repre-
sentatives of both labor unions and management.
The analysis by Dr. Fred Witney presented here includes a broad
historical survey of the question and incorporates an analysis of the
efifect of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, on their right to
join unions of their own choosing. Because the question is a technical
one and still rests on administrative and judicial decisions, references
to the major sources are included. Those interested in analyzing the
technical aspects of this question, from the point of view of the
applicability of the Labor ]\Ianagement Relations Act, 1947, to plant-
protection employees, will find the references both comprehensive and
up to date. For those with a more general interest. Dr. Witney's discus-
sion provides a stimulating review of the question.-
—
Phillips Bradley
A limited number of additional copies will be furnished free of charge
on request. On lot orders, a charge of five cents a copy will be
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